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THE SAN DIEGO - TIJUANA BORDER REGION
I. INTRODUCTION
Southern California has been under siege from the flow of treated and
partially treated sewage from the Tijuana region in Mexico since the
mid-1930s. Although the wastewater management situation has improved
in recent years, new challenges have emerged that threaten further
progress.
Today, the Tijuana region generates about fifty million gallons per day
(mgd) of sewage.' Of the fifty mgd, the South Bay International
Wastewater Treatment Plant (SBIWTP), which is operated by the United
States Section of the International Boundary and Water Commission
(USIBWC),2 treats approximately twenty-five mgd3 under an international
I. H.R. Doc. No. 106-179, at 1 (2000).
2. See infra text accompanying footnote 21.
3. Southbay International Wastewater Treatment Plant, available at http://www.
ibwc.state.gov/ENVIRONM/SBIWTP/sbiwtp.html (last visited May 11, 2002). The
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agreement with Mexico.
4
Following the treatment by the SBIWTP, the effluent is then
discharged about three miles offshore into the waters of the United
States through the South Bay Ocean Outfall (SBOO). The remaining
twenty-five mgd of wastewater not treated by the SB1WTP is discharged
directly into Mexican waters from the Mexican treatment plant at San
Antonio de los Buenos.
The Tijuana River, which flows in a northwest direction from Mexico
into the United States, empties into the Pacific Ocean through an estuary
about two miles north of the border. The river is the natural water
course for the Tijuana watershed. The watershed encompasses some
1700 square miles, with about twenty-five percent of it being in
California.5 The Mexican portion of the watershed flows through
Tijuana, which is one of the fastest growing cities in Mexico, whereas
the portion in California is not highly developed.6  Urban runoff,
stormwater, and planned and unplanned sewage discharges into the
Tijuana River from the Tijuana watershed have a direct impact in the
United States as well as in Mexico.
For approximately five miles before it enters the United States, the
Tijuana River has been channelized in a concrete structure. The natural
banks of the river are defined by this channel. This concrete channel
continues for a mile or so after crossing the border. This aspect of the
river is significant because the natural absorptive capacity of the river
bottom and banks has been lost. Thus, the channelized portion of the
river acts as an effective transporter of pollution from the surrounding
Tijuana watershed.
The Tijuana estuary, which lies at the mouth of the river, is one of the
most important tidal wetlands along the Southern California coast.
7
plant has the ability to treat intermittent surges of up to about forty-five mgd.
4. Under treaty Minute 283, discussed in detail later in the article, the SBIWTP
treats sewage flows that exceed the capacity of the existing Tijuana sewage conveyance
and treatment system. See infra note 23. Although Mexico pays for this treatment, the
treatment is heavily subsidized by the United States. Mexico pays approximately ten
percent of the cost of treatment. Id.
5. Southern California Wetlands Recovery Project, Regional Strategy: County
Objectives, at 2 (Nov. 1, 2001), available at http://www.coastalconservancy.ca.gov/
scwrp/. Of the 1700 square miles of watershed, about 1245 square miles are in Mexico
and approximately 455 square miles are in the United States. Id.
6. Id.
7. The estuary has been designated by the Department of Commerce's National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) as a National Estuarine Research
Unseasonable, dry-weather wastewater flows from the Tijuana watershed
that reach the estuary cause significant harm. The harm is acerbated by
wet-weather flows which effectively flush the pollution in the river
system into the estuary. These flows upset the delicate balance of the
estuary's ecosystem.
8
Although the river valley and estuary are obviously affected by such
wastewater discharges, the surrounding community is also broadly
impacted. The coastal shore areas and adjacent ocean waters from
Rosarito Beach, Mexico and northward through San Diego, California
also are affected, both by the uncontrolled discharges and the planned
discharges from the SBIWTP. In addition, the shore areas and coastal
waters in Mexico, and to a lesser extent the United States, are impacted
by the discharges from the Mexican treatment plant at San Antonio de
los Buenos.
The purpose of this article is to examine recent developments in the
long-standing struggle by the United States and Mexico to cope with
managing cross-border wastewater. Two notable legal developments
have occurred recently that are fundamental to understanding the
situation today. One is legislative, and the other is judicial. Neither has
received scholarly comment.
The first is the enactment of Tijuana River Valley Estuary and Beach
Cleanup Act, which was signed into United States' law in 2000. It
signified a significant change in policy by Congress. Prior to the
enactment of the Cleanup Act, the international agreement contained in
Minute 283 specified that both the primary and the secondary
wastewater treatment required by the federal Clean Water Act was to be
done in the United States. However, the Cleanup Act authorized the
Secretary of State to negotiate and execute an agreement providing for
secondary treatment to be done in Mexico.
The second development occurred on the judicial front. It resulted
from the failure of the United States to comply with federal and
California water quality permit standards contained in the International
Wastewater Treatment Plant's NPDES permit. This permit contains
effluent limitations for total suspended solids (TSS) and chemical and
Reserve (NERR). See National Estuarine Research Reserve System, Tijuana River
Reserve, available at http://www.ocrm.nos.noaa.gov/nerr/reserves/nerrtijuana.html (last
visited May 11, 2002). The NERR system is a partnership program between NOAA and
coastal states to protect and study important coastal resources. Photographs of the
Tijuana River National Estuarine Research Reserve are available at http://www.photolib.
noaa.gov/nerr/esind3.htm (photo nerrOll2 provides an aerial view of the estuary).
8. Mexico is currently in the process of developing wastewater reclamation
projects adjacent to the Tijuana River. As discussed later in the article, these projects
have the potential of adversely affecting the estuary. See infra note 20 and accompanying
text.
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biological oxygen demand (CBOD5) consistent with "secondary treatment,"
9
as required by the Clean Water Act. It also includes effluent limitations
for acute and chronic toxicity and ammonia in order to implement
California water quality standards, including requirements based on
standards contained in the California Ocean Plan and San Diego Basin
Plan.
In early 2001, California filed suit against the United States for failing
to meet its permit obligations. This action was considered necessary
because the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity limited California's
other options to effectively deal with the situation. The suit was filed in
federal district court over the continuing operation of SBIWTP in
violation of the secondary treatment requirements imposed by federal
and state law. In the litigation, California has not taken a position on
where the secondary treatment should occur, only that it should occur as
promptly and under a court-supervised schedule of implementation.
Taken together, these developments are certain to provide a strong
impetus to breaking the current logjam of political inaction. Until this
happens, the United States will continue to operate the SBIWTP in
violation of its obligations under international agreement with Mexico as
well as under federal and state law.
II. THE CHALLENGE
- The inability to properly manage the flow of cross-border water
pollution affects a wide array of public interests on both sides of the
border. General water quality in the region is degraded. Toxic
pollutants, water-borne bacterial and viral pathogens contained in the
sewage threaten the health and safety of the public.'0 Property values
9. Protection of the Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 133.102 (2001). The U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines "secondary treatment" in terms of
minimum level of effluent quality attainable by the treatment in terms of numerical
values for three conventional water quality parameters: biochemical oxygen demand
(BOD), suspended solids (SS), and acidity (pH). Id. Based on a thirty-day average, for
example, the rate is set at not less than eighty-five percent removal for the BOD and SS
water quality parameters. Id. The effluent values for pH shall be maintained within the
limits of 6.0 to 9.0 unless the publicly owned treatment works demonstrates that: (l)
Inorganic chemicals are not added to the waste stream as part of the treatment process;
and (2) contributions from industrial sources do not cause the pH of the effluent to be
less than 6.0 or greater than 9.0. Id. See also Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §
1311(b)(l)(B)(2001) (authorizing the Administrator of the EPA to define secondary
treatment).
10. EPA, Office of Wastewater Management, Status Report on the Water and
Wastewater Infrastructure Program for the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands, EPA-832-R-00-
are diminished, ecosystems are damaged, and the tourist industry is
adversely impacted. Thus, effectively regulating cross-border wastewater
presents an important international challenge.
Cross-border water pollution in the San Diego-Tijuana border region
is driven by various forces. Some of the physical considerations are
unalterable. A cursory glance at a map at the beginning of this article
reveals that the Tijuana River flows northward from Mexico into the
United States before finding its way to the Pacific Ocean. The river
naturally flows northward because Mexico is at a higher elevation than
the United States. In addition, the terminus of two major urban canyons,
Smuggler Gulch (Canon del Matadero) and Goat Canyon, drain the
surrounding watershed directly into United States territory.
Another natural feature is the northward littoral near-shore current
during various times of the year, principally during the winter and
spring." Water pollution entering the ocean from the Tijuana River
flows northward along the coast of Southern California. In addition,
Tijuana wastewater is discharged directly into the ocean from the
Mexican treatment plant at San Antonio de los Buenos. This effluent
plume is trapped in the near-shore area of the coastal waters, where it
also flows northward during the winter and spring. As a result of
topography and current flow, significant amounts of water pollution flow
naturally from Mexico into the United States or its coastal waters.
The Tijuana River has been heavily polluted for years, but the water
pollution problems from wastewater grew significantly worse during the
1980s and 1990s as people migrated in increasing numbers to the
Tijuana area in search of work. The generation of cross-border water
pollution is directly linked to the population growth in the Tijuana
region. At least in part, population growth has been stimulated by the
"free-trade" economic opportunities provided by the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)12  and maquiladora plants. 3
007, at 5 (May 2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/OWM/mxsumrpt.htm. Hepatitis
A and Shigellosis (amoebic dysentery) rates in the U.S. in the border region are three
times the average in other parts of the U.S. Amebiasis and Typhoid fever rates are also
higher. Id.; Pan American Health Organization website at htpp://www.fep.paho.org/
healthprofiles (last visited Feb. 28, 2002).
II. City of San Diego Metropolitan Wastewater Department, Final Report, Ocean
Imaging: Utilization of Remotely-sense Imagery for Detection and Tracking of Coastal
Sewage Discharge, at 8 (January 25, 2000) (on file with author).
12. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No.
103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993). Some important features of NAFTA include the
elimination of tariffs, restrictions on indirect trade barriers, liberalization of cross-border
flows of services and limits on rules of origin. Id.
13. See Lance Eliot Brouthers, Maquiladoras: entrepreneurial experimentation to
global competitiveness, Business Horizons, Mar-Apr 1999, at 1, available at http://www.
findarticles.com/cfdls/m 1038/2_42/54370814/pl/article.jhtml (last visited May
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Demographic projections predict a continuing increase in population, so
the problems with managing Mexican wastewater will continue to press
decision-makers for effective solutions in the years ahead.
An expanding population 14 and growing economy in the Tijuana region
predictably mean that more wastewater will be generated. 15 Unfortunately,
the Tijuana sewage control facilities, both wastewater collection and
treatment, are already inadequate. The system is overburdened and
struggling to keep pace with the demands placed on it.
The inability of Mexico to successfully treat, control and dispose of
this sewage is compounded by a shortage of financial resources, an
inadequate infrastructure and a lack of technical expertise. 16 Notwithstanding
these constraints, several initiatives are currently underway to address
wastewater issues in Mexico. One is the preparation of a Master Plan
for Potable Water and Wastewater Services for Tijuana and Playas de
Rosarito (Master Plan).17 The Master Plan project is being financially
supported by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), North
American Development Bank (NADBank), and the Comisi6n Estatal de
Servicios Ptiblicos de Tijuana (CESPT).' Another project intended to
15, 2002). In 1965, Mexico implemented the maquiladora program which allows
goods to be imported duty-free so they can be assembled for export, mostly to the United
States. In the mid-1980s, maquiladoras transformed Baja California into a center for
Asian consumer electronic production. Id. at 4.
14. SDSU, Institute for Regional Studies of the Californias: Tijuana Basic
Information Pages, at 3, available at http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/-irsc/tjreport/tj3.html
(last visited May 11, 2002). Based on 2000 census estimates, the population of Tijuana
is slightly more than 1.2 million.
15. Suzanne M. Michel, Defining Hydrocommons Governance Along the Border
of the Californias: A Case Study of Transbasin Diversions and Water Quality in the
Tijuana-San Diego Metropolitan Region, 40 Nat. Res. J. 931, 949 (2000). Although the
generation of more wastewater is likely, this result is not inevitable, at least in the short-
term. Between 1987 and 1997, for example, the Southern California Metropolitan Water
District claims to have met the demand from a 2.8 million increase in population through
conservation. Id. Water recycling also tends to dampen the generation of excess
wastewater.
16. In June 2001, for example, the San Diego Regional Water Quality Control
Board adopted a resolution requesting $697,000 from the State Water Resources Control
Board to provide technical assistance to the State of Baja for the implementation of
industrial wastewater pretreatment programs in the cities of Tijuana and Tecate.
California Regional Water Quality Control Board, Region 9 San Diego, Adopted Orders,
Resolutions and Decisions, Resolution 2001-177 (June 2001), available at
http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/-rwqcb9/Orders/orders.html (last visited May 11, 2002).
17. See U.S. EPA, Region 9: Water Programs, Tijuana Master Plan for Waste and
Wastewater Infrastructure (Fact Sheet), at 1 (Oct. 2001), available at www.epa.gov/
region09/water/tijuana/factmp 1101.pdf.
18. Id. CESPT is the State Water Utility Commission responsible for providing
reduce sewage overflows and spills, including those into the Tijuana River, is
the Tijuana Sewer Rehabilitation Project (Rehabilitation Project). Work
on the Rehabilitation Project in coordination with the Master Plan is
planned to commence in 2002. The funding for the project is to be
provided by the same agencies supporting the development of the Master
Plan. 19
In addition to these projects, Mexico is also in the process of
developing wastewater reclamation projects connected with new
development in the eastern part of Tijuana. CESPT has obtained
financing from the Japanese government to construct four wastewater
reclamation plants, two20 of which are in the vicinity of the Rodriguez
reservoir and adjacent to the upper reaches of the Tijuana River. The
two reclamation projects adjacent to the Tijuana River have the potential
to adversely impact the Tijuana estuary. To the extent that the water
market is unable to use the full extent of the reclaimed water, the excess
would be a new source of discharge to the Tijuana River, which would
affect the volume of water reaching the estuary. An increase in the
water volume from these plants has the potential of disrupting the
ecosystem balance of the estuary. This concern about new discharges to
the Tijuana River is a management issue that must be addressed by the
United States in its border dealings with Mexico.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND WATER
COMMISSION (IBWC)
The International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) is a bi-
national commission consisting of a United States Section and Mexican
Section. 1 The United States Section is organized under the Departmentof State, and the Mexican Section, Comision Internacional de Limites y
water and wastewater services, and the managing agency for the development of the
Water and Wastewater Master Plan for the cities of Tijuana and Playas de Rosarito, Baja
California, Mexico. Id.
19. U.S. EPA, Region 9: Water Programs, Tijuana Sewer Rehabilitation Project(Fact Sheet), at 1 (Oct. 2001), available at http://epa.gov/region09/water/tijuana/
fact1 101.pdf.
20. Planta de Tratamiento "Monte de Los Olivos" and Planta de Tratamiento "La
Morita" (on file with author).
21. The International Boundary Commission was formed in 1889, and renamed the
International Boundary and Water Commission following the Treaty Between the United
States of America and Mexico Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and
Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, U.S.-Mex., 59 Stat. 1219, 1945
Westlaw 26968 (U.S. Treaty) T.S. No. 994 [hereinafter 1944 Water Treaty]. See also
Stephen P. Mumme, The Institutional Framework for Transboundary Inland Water
Management in North America: Mexico, Canada, the United States, and Their
Binational Agencies, Commission on Environmental Cooperation, at IV.3 (1996) (on file
with author). For additional information visit the International Boundary and Water
Commission website, athttp://www.ibwc.state.gov/.
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Aguas (CILA), is organized under the Ministry of Foreign Relations of
Mexico. The Commission is charged with dealing with water problems
along the border.22
IBWC international activities are conducted through "Minutes," which
typically are short documents having the force of law when the
governments of both countries provide written notification of approval
through their respective sections of the IBWC.23 The Minutes define a
joint United States-Mexican project or program and then set out
strategies for achieving an agreed goal or project in contractual terms or
in terms of a resolution expressed in a Memorandum of Understanding
("MOU"). As discussed more fully below, Minutes 270, 283 and 296
provide the basic legal framework to cross-border cooperative efforts in
this region for wastewater.
IV. A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Cross-border sewage in the Tijuana River Valley has been a problem
for close to seventy years. In 1928, Tijuana had a community septic
tank system serving approximately 500 people. By the mid-1930s, the
community's population had surged to 5,000, with no concurrent
increase in its sewage treatment capacity, with resulting contamination
discharges into the Tijuana River.2 In 1935, a new septic tank system
22. In addition, the Border Environmental Cooperation Commission (BECC) and
the North American Development Bank (NADBank) operate under a side agreement to
NAFTA. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the United Mexican States Concerning the Establishment of a Border
Environment Cooperation Commission and a North American Development Bank, Nov.
16-18, 1993, T.I.A.S. No. 12516 [hereinafter Charter]. Other organizations also are
involved with environmental problems along the border. BECC's mission is to identify,
support, evaluate and certify affordable environmental infrastructure projects and to
improve the quality of life for the people in the U.S.-Mexico border region. Id. at Ch. I,
art. 1. It is governed by a ten-member binational Board of Directors (five from each
country), and is assisted by an eighteen-member binational Advisory Council (nine from
each country). Id. at Ch. I, arts. 1, 3, & 5. NADBank is a bilaterally-funded,
international organization, in which Mexico and the United States participate as equal
partners. Id. at Ch. II, art. VI at §§ 2-3.
23. International Boundary and Water Commission (IWBC), Distribution of
Construction, Operation and Maintenance Costs for the International Wastewater
Treatment Plant Constructed Under the Agreements in Commission Minute No. 283 for
the Solution of the Border Sanitation Problem at San Diego, California/Tijuana, Baja
California, Resolution 15 [hereinafter Treaty Minutes will be cited as: IWBC, supra note
23, Minute ###, Recommendation #4], available at http://www.ibwc.state.gov/
FORAFFAI/MINUTES/minindex.HTM (last visited May 11, 2002).
24. E. Meyer, California Regional Water Quality Control Board, San Diego
Region: Staff Report, History of Sewage Facilities Serving the City of Tijuana Baja,
was built to accommodate the wastewater of Tijuana's expanding
population. The system was quickly overloaded causing untreated sewage,
once again, to contaminate agricultural lands and ground water in the
Tijuana River basin.25
In 1938, with funding from the United States, an International Outfall
system was constructed on the U.S. side of the border to carry
wastewater from Tijuana and from various federal buildings in the San
Ysidro area. Trunk sewer lines within Mexico were funded by the
Northern Territory of Baja. The San Diego County operated the outfall
system, with operation and maintenance costs being shared by the
County and the Northern Territory of Baja.26 However, management
and control problems continued.
To more comprehensively address border-related water issues, on
February 3, 1944, the United States and Mexico entered into the Treaty
Between the United States of American and Mexico Respecting the
Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio
Grande.27 In Article 3 of the treaty, beneficial use preferences were
identified in connection with the joint use of international waters. 2' The
beneficial use of water was subject to an important caveat: "All of the
foregoing [beneficial] uses shall be subject to any sanitary measures or
works which may be mutually agreed upon by the two governments,
which hereby agree to give preferential attention to the solution of all
border sanitation problems." 9 This provision is significant because it
elevates the importance of finding cooperative solutions to the problem
of cross-border water pollution. It also is important because it provides
the basis for imposing mandatory legal obligations on the United States
and Mexico, pursuant to subsequent international agreements, such as
Minutes.
By 1948, Tijuana continued to face population growth. Its more than
50,000 citizens were generating sewage effluent in excess of 2.5 mgd.3°
Given the inadequate size of the collection and treatment system, the
result was predictable. Tijuana began discharging essentially untreated
sewage into the outfall. While the effluent problem was evident, official
action to address the continuing problem did not occur until 1953. In
December 1953, the San Diego Regional Water Pollution Control Board
Mexico, at 1 (1983) [hereinafter Staff Report] (on file with author).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 2.
27. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 21, art. III.
28. Id. The first paragraph of this article identifies "domestic and municipal uses"
as the first preference. Id.
29. Id.
30. Staff Report, supra note 24, at 3.
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adopted Resolution 53-5, declaring that the outfall was creating a
pollution problem. The resolution also asked the governor of California
to address the issue. However, long-term solutions were not
forthcoming.3'
In 1958, the Regional Board requested that the Governor ask the U.S.
Department of State for immediate emergency action. The State
Department response was largely bureaucratic. It advised that the
Mexican Ministry of Hydraulic Resources was studying the possibility
of confining the effluent to the Mexican side of the border, and that
technical assistance from the U.S. Public Health Service was available to
the region.32
A more encouraging step occurred in 1958 with the San Diego
Metropolitan Sewage Master Plan that included an interceptor
connection for conveying sewage from Tijuana to the metropolitan
system for processing. Shortly thereafter, the political winds of progress
shifted when Mexico informed the United States Commissioner of the
IBWC that it intended to treat most or all of its wastewater in Tijuana.
While Mexico remained interested in the possibility of using the San
Diego metropolitan system for standby purposes, it was not interested in
discharging all of its effluent into the San Diego metropolitan system.3 3
V. THE MODERN ERA
A. Treaty Developments
The modern era for dealing with wastewater in the San Diego-Tijuana
border region began in the 1980s. It started with the adoption of Minute
270, which provides the structural framework for analyzing contemporary
wastewater events in the San Diego-Tijuana border region.
1. Minute 270
In 1985, Mexico promised to undertake specific action to address the
wastewater problem. In Minute 270, it agreed to upgrade its wastewater
management operations, at least within the framework of the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB), in order to address the effects of
raw sewage spills into the Tijuana River. Among other planned construction
projects, Mexico agreed to build two sewage treatment plants.
31. Staff Report, supra note 24, at 5.
32. Staff Report, supra note 24, at 6.
33. Staff Report, supra note 24, at 10
The first plant, the San Antonio de los Buenos Sewage Treatment
Plant, was completed and began operating in 1987. It is located
approximately five miles south of the border on the Baja coast at Punta
de los Buenos. Today, the plant receives about twenty-five mgd of
sewage from Tijuana. Approximately seventeen mgd is treated before
being discharged. The rest, about eight mgd, bypasses the plant and
therefore receives no treatment. Both the treated and the untreated
effluent, are discharged onto the beach through the Los Buenos Creek
before entering the Pacific Ocean. The second treatment plant, Rio El
Alamar, was to be located at the confluence of the Tijuana and Alamar
Rivers in the Tijuana River Valley. It was never built because Minute
283 rendered it unnecessary.
2. Minute 283
In 1987, Congress authorized the construction of an international
wastewater treatment facility in San Diego, California to provide for
treatment of municipal sewage and industrial waste from Mexico,
including Tijuana. 34 The international treatment plant was envisioned as
satisfying Mexico's commitment to build the Rio El Alamar plant under
Minute 270. Conceptually, Congress appeared to finally settle, at least
as a matter of policy, where treatment would occur. It would be in the
United States.
Progress on the international front was slow. In July 1990, three years
after Congress acted, the United States and Mexico agreed to Minute
283, entitled "A Conceptual Plan for the International Solution to the Border
Sanitation Problem in San Diego, California/Tijuana, Baja California."
For the first time, an international framework to the collection, treatment
and disposal of some of Tijuana's sewage began to emerge.
The United States committed to building a bi-national wastewater
treatment plant in California to treat Mexican sewage. The United
States, acting through the IBWC, agreed to provide primary and secondary
treatment for twenty-five mgd of the dry-weather sewage flow at the
International Wastewater Treatment Plant (IWTP). This new agreement
clearly was not a comprehensive solution because it did not address wet-
weather stormwater flows, the inadequacy of the San Antonio plant, or
the need for more capacity beyond the agreed upon twenty-five mgd.
Nevertheless, it was a step in the right direction.
34. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7, 80-81 (1987),
codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1251 note.
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The costs of construction, operation and maintenance 35 were to be
shared between the two countries.36 The cost to Mexico was limited to
the projected cost of the planned but never built, Rio El Alamar
treatment plant. 37 Pursuant to Minute 283, Mexico agreed to construct a
collection system to convey the sewage to the Mexican side of the
border in the proximity of the international treatment plant and to
dispose of the sludge resulting from the plant's treatment of Tijuana's
wastewater in Mexico.38
In order to assure "efficient treatment," Mexico also agreed to "require
all industries to provide appropriate pre-treatment of wastewaters that
those industries may discharge into the Tijuana sewage collection
system which would in turn discharge into the international sewage
treatment plant. ' 39 To date, Mexico has taken steps toward realizing this
objective. In some measure, progress may be limited due to the fact
that "efficiency" is not connected to the usual standards for primary
treatment, such as BOD or TSS removals, of industrial waste. In the
context of advanced primary treatment, this "efficient treatment"
requirement has minimal practical effect on controlling the industrial
effluent coming into the IWTP.
One aspect of Minute 283 that is apt to become increasingly important
is the provision dealing with reclamation and reuse of wastewater. With
respect to continuing entitlement to the wastewater, it states: "[B]oth
Governments reserve the right to return for reuse in their respective
territories part or all of the international treatment plant effluent
35. IBWC, supra note 23, at Minute 296, Recommendation 2 (setting the operation
and maintenance costs at $0.034 per cubic meter for up to the 25 mgd, with adjustments
"as needed."). This amount was based on the cost that Mexico would have expended in
1997 in the operation and maintenance of the proposed Rio Alamar plant. Id.
36. IBWC, supra note 23, at Minute 283, Recommendation 3.
37. Id. at Recommendation 7. The amount of Mexico's contribution was set at
$16.8 million. IBWC, supra note 23, at Minute 296, Recommendation 1.
38. IBWC, supra note 23, at Minute 283, Recommendation 10.
39. Id. at Recommendation 12.
40. Progress is being made. In the year 2000, 190 industries were inspected by the
Baja California Department of Ecology. Out of the 190 industries inspected, 49 were
cited and fined for discharging waste into the sewer collection system outside the
Mexican norms or standards. Out of the 49 industries cited and fined, 6 were shut down
until they could provide adequate pretreatment of their wastes before discharging to the
sewer collection system. Statement of Adolfo Report of Gonzalez, Director General,
Direcci6n General de Ecologia, at the San Diego/Tijuana Pretreatment Meeting, Planta
de Tratamiento San Antonio de Los Buenos (October 22, 2001) (on file with author).
corresponding to each country's sewage inflows.' This provision
gives Mexico a future source of supply for water recycling.
The USIBWC was charged with the responsibility of operating the
international treatment plant, now known as the SBIWTP. The facility
is located in the United States on seventy-five acres of land near the
border. To implement Minute 283, Congress authorized funds for the
development of both primary and secondary treatment at the SBIWTP,
in addition to funds for the development of the federal government's
share of the South Bay Ocean Outfall (SBOO).42 It set a statutory cap on
funds for the SBIWTP, both for primary and secondary treatment and
disposal, at $239.4 million.43 As discussed below, this funding cap
would play an important role in subsequent developments.
3. Minute 296
Minute 296 was signed by the representatives to the IBWC on April
16, 1997. It recommended the specific distribution of costs for the construction,
operation and maintenance of the SBIWTP. Equally important, Minute
296 proposed building the SBIWTP in two phases. As of this writing,
the implementation of the second phase module has not yet occurred,
and this failure is the reason for the lawsuit by California against the
IBWC discussed below. an
The first phase module, which was designed to meet "advanced primary
standards," was intended to achieve "some treatment" of Mexican wastewater
as quickly as possible. This phase one module was intended to expedite
treatment of up to twenty-five mgd of untreated sewage from Tijuana,
which otherwise would have continued to pollute the Tijuana River and
Estuary along with the adjacent coastal waters. The second phase was
intended to implement "secondary" treatment standards.
The first module opened in 1998 as an advanced primary plant
discharging through an emergency connection to the City of San Diego's
Point Loma treatment facility. In early 1999, the SBIWTP plant began
discharging Mexican wastewater through the SBOO. Since then, the
plant has discharged approximately twenty-five mgd of sewage from
Mexico, which is the equivalent of close to ten billion gallons of effluent
45per year.
41. IBWC, supra note 23, at Minute 283, Recommendation 11.
42. Tijuana River Valley Estuary and Beach Sewage Cleanup Act of 2000, 22
U.S.C. §§ 277d-43 to 277d-46 (2000).
43. Act of October 6, 1992, Pub. L. 102-389, 106 Stat. 1571, 1599 (1992).
44. See infra text accompanying Part V. D.
45. U.S. EPA & U.S. IWBC, Record of Decision for the International Boundary and
Water Commission South Bay International Waterwater Treatment Plant: Long Term
Treatment Options, Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement, at 2, (December, 8 1999)
[hereinafter Final SEIS], available at http://www.epa.gov/region09/ water/iwt/iwtprod.pdf.
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The legal problem with the discharge from the first phase module is
straightforward. It violates the water quality permit standards required
by the Clean Water Act (CWA) and Porter-Cologne Act.46 As previously
mentioned, the failure is not just a technical quibble. The effluent
discharged through the SBOO into waters of the United States
consistently fails acute and chronic toxicity tests.
Implementation of the second phase module was delayed by an
ongoing debate about the type of pollution control system that would be
selected to meet secondary treatment standards. The EPA and USIBWC
considered various options during the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) review process mandated by federal law.47 A completely
mixed aerated (CMA) pond system4 or the activated sludge system were
the two competing options that were identified as most likely to be used
to achieve secondary treatment.
In 1999, the EPA and USIBWC signed a Record of Decision
recommending the CMA pond-based system, which was to be located on
land adjacent to the SBIWTP. The recommendation was based on
environmental and cost-effectiveness considerations. 49 The EPA project
manager estimated that design of the phase two project would take eight
46. Cal. Water Code §§ 13000-14958 (2002). California participates in the
NPDES program pursuant to §§ 13160-13169, 13200-13260. Id. Chapter 5.5 of the
Porter-Cologne Act, beginning with section 13370, provides the statutory basis for the
requirement of consistency between state and federal water quality control programs and
for regional boards to issue waste discharge requirements to implement National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) regulations. See Cal. Water Code §§
13370-13389.
47. Pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§
4321-4347 (2001), two EISs were prepared. The first is dated February 1994, consists of
two volumes, and identifies the U.S. EPA and IBWC (U.S. Section) as the lead agencies.
It recommended a secondary activated sludge wastewater treatment facility. The second
is dated March 1999, and is identified as the "Final Supplemental EIS." Pursuant to this
supplemental process, the lead agencies selected the CMA Pond System as the preferred
alternative. Copies of these reports are available at http://www.epa.gov/region09/
water/iwtp/.
48. Final SEIS, supra note 45, at 4. The CMA pond system is a wastewater
treatment technology consisting of parallel trains of ponds working in sequence. The
working components are Anaerobic Digester Pits (ADP), Completely Mixed Aerated
(CMA) Ponds, and Partially Mixed Aerated Ponds. They operate using settling and
completely mixed activated treatment processes. As proposed, the primary effluent, after
settling, is transferred from the ADP to the CMA ponds. Wastewater in the CMA pond
is continuously aerated by diffusers using a fine bubble aeration system at the bottom of
the pond to optimize air transfer and oxidation before being transferred to the Partially
Mixed Aerated Ponds. Id. at 1-4..
49. Final SEIS, supra note 45.
to ten months and would cost about eight million dollars. It was also
estimated that construction would take an additional two years and cost
about forty-four million dollars.
50
The recommendation proved to be politically unpalatable. The
stranglehold on moving forward with the recommendation was the
funding of the CMA pond-based system. Congressional action was
needed for additional funding because completion of the secondary
treatment project would exceed the $239.4 million cap set by Congress.
B. The Bajagua Project
Considered, but rejected in the environmental Record of Decision, was
the Bajagua project, a privately funded facility owned by Agua Clara,
LLC. It would be located in Tijuana, Mexico. It was proposed as an
alternative to doing secondary treatment at the SBIWTP. Rather than
discharging the effluent through the SBOO, the SBIWTP would send the
advanced primary effluent to the Bajagua pond-based system in Mexico.
The effluent would receive secondary treatment there.
This approach would "avoid" the capital cost incurred with building
the facility in the United States. As part of this proposal, the Bajagua
project would enter into a fee-for-services contract with the USIBWC
that would allow the "avoided" capital cost to be recovered on an annual
basis through the contract. 51 Thus, the so-called "avoided" capital cost
would be annualized through the fee-for-services agreement.
The total actual cost associated with doing the treatment using
Bajagua would be greater for several reasons. First, additional cost
would be incurred in pumping the advanced primary uphill from the
SBIWTP to the Bajagua facility. Second, additional cost would be
incurred in building the pipelines to convey the effluent to and from the
Bajagua facility, to the extent it is discharged from the SBOO. Finally,
because Bajagua would treat a greater amount of wastewater, fifty mgd
instead of twenty-five mgd, the treatment costs would be larger.
On the other hand, several advantages to the Bajagua proposal can be
identified. The effluent treated by Bajagua could be used for water
recycling purposes in Mexico or returned to the SB1WTP for discharge
through the SBOO in the event it could not be used locally. To the
extent that the Bajagua treated wastewater could be recycled and
distributed in Tijuana, the recycled water would become available to free
50. Leslie Wolf Branscomb, Sewage Treatment Project is Far from a Done Deal,
S.D. Union Trib., December 9, 1999, at BI, B6, available at 1999 WL 29196752.
However, the $44 million included certain non-treatment costs, such as the construction
of an administration building and library.
51. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-44(c)(2)(E) & (1) (2001. Section (E) referring to "contract
term of 20 years" and Section (I) referring to "annual amount payable."
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up potable water supplies for other uses, or as the raw material for the
production of potable water.52 In addition, the recycled water would
tend to reduce the cost of importing water from outside the region and
would provide a cushion against periods of water shortage. Of course,
the expanded use of recycled water would require a distribution system
connected to the end-users, which does not currently exist.
Another advantage lies in the expandable capacity of the Bajagua
project. The project is planned to treat fifty mgd, with the ability to add
additional capacity at a later date. In contrast, the SBIWTP has limited
land capacity using a pond-based system to expand beyond its current
twenty-five mgd capacity, although some expansion might be accomplished
with a smaller amount of dedicated land using an activated sludge
system. As the need for expanded plant capacity arises in the future,
Bajagua offers a more promising means of meeting this additional
capacity.
Finally, one can argue that making the wastewater available for beneficial
use in Tijuana is consistent with Mexico's legal entitlement, as well as
with sound public policy. This argument is based on the view that the
wastewater is a potentially valuable asset owned by Mexico. In
addition, the goal of international cooperation supports the view that the
United States should assist Mexico with meeting its water needs by
making this potentially valuable resource productive, rather than simply
discharging it as waste through the SBOO.
Notwithstanding these arguable advantages, the Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement prepared by the EPA and USIBWC,
rejected the Bajagua proposal in both the Draft and Final SEIS as
"infeasible." 53 A variety of objections to the project were stated. It was
argued that the Bajagua proposal could not achieve the goal of providing
secondary treatment in an expeditious manner, whereas the environmental
review of doing secondary treatment in the United States was completed
and was consistent with Minute 283. Additionally, the need for a
lengthy Mexican review process and the need to enact authorizing
legislation by the United States, because Minute 283 requires the
secondary treatment facilities be located in the United States, worked
52. This advantage is not unique to the Bajagua project. In fact, any facility in
Tijuana producing recycled water, pursuant to the terms of Minute 283, would carry the
same benefit. IBWC, supra note 23, at Minute 283.
53. Final SEIS, supra note 45, at 5.
against the timely completion of the project. 54  Also, the uncertainty
associated with Mexico's support of the project also was stated as a
concern that might hinder moving forward quickly with the project.55
Another reason was the absence of enforceable legal mechanisms to
ensure that the effluent returned to the SBIWTP would meet the required
secondary standards. Other related legal concerns included ensuring
ongoing operation in the event of Agua Clara's bankruptcy, and determining
whether the SBIWTP or Agua Clara would be the permittee
5 6
A final reason for opposing the Bajagua proposal was based on
statutory obstacles found in United States law. The project, it was
argued, would be subject to the federal Competition in Contracting Act
(CICA), which requires a full and open competition in soliciting offers
and awarding government contracts. Since the Bajagua project was the
only one put forward in Mexico, the application of the CICA arguably
might constrain going forward with the project. While this concern is
legitimate as a general matter, the CICA does not contain a blanket
prohibition. The use of noncompetitive procedures is permitted by the
CICA under certain circumstances.58
One exception to competitive procedures specified under the act exists
when the services, in this case the provision of secondary treatment, are
54. Id.
55. Id. Mexico has sent mixed signals on the issue. "On December 1, 1999, the
Mexican IBWC Commissioner, Arturo Herrera Solis, reiterated the Mexican position
that secondary treatment in Mexico is not a viable alternative at this time (emphasis
added)." Final SEIS, supra note 45, at 15. In contrast, a letter from the mayor of
Tijuana, Mexico was read into the record during the debate in the House of
Representatives on the Cleanup Act. It described the Bajagua project as representative
of the "kind of entrepreneurial solution" needed to provide secondary treatment, and the
"type of private sector solution" that could be extolled as a model. 146 Cong. Rec.
H7470-03, 7473. A recent statement by the Commissioner of the USIBWC casts doubt
on Mexico's support: "Even if negotiations could proceed, there is much doubt about
whether Mexico would accept the specific terms dictated by the estuary bill (Cleanup
Act)." Carlos M. Ramirez, Mexican sewage issue needs to be addressed, even if only
partially, S.D. Union Trib., November 9, 2001, at B9. In addition, the terms of reference
for contracting consulting services for the preparation of the Tijuana Master Plan do not
include a firm commitment to the Bajagua project. They provide: "Alternatives for
wastewater treatment infrastructure shall be developed with and without the Bajagua
Project as a planning assumption." Terms of Reference for the Contracting of Consulting
Services, Master Plan for Potable Water and Wastewater Services for Tijuana and Playas
de Rosarito, B.C., at 15 (August 2001) (emphasis added) (on file with author).
56. Final SEIS, supra note 45, at 3 & 10.
57. 41 U.S.C. § 253 (1997). The Competition in Contract Act generally requires
federal agencies to acquire goods and services through an open competitive process. Id.
at § 253(f). Because the project does not involve the expenditure of Mexican public
funds, no comparable Mexican competitive procedures would be triggered.
58. 41 U.S.C. § 253(c). This section provides various exceptions to the use of
competitive procedures that might have been considered applicable to the Bajagua
project.
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available from "only one responsible source" to meet the needs of the
executive agency. 59 Another exception exists when an "unusual and
compelling urgency" exists.60 A third possible exception exists when the
head of the executive agency determines that it is necessary to the public
interest and Congress is notified.6' Thus, the CICA, while perhaps an
obstacle, is not an absolute bar to the Bajagua.
The SEIS identified other potential statutory difficulties under United
States law. These include the provisions of the Anti-Deficiency Act
62
and Budget Enforcement Act.63 Although these laws also raise legitimate
concerns, they also do not amount to insurmountable obstacles.
Congress has the ability to eliminate them as serious legal barriers,
which it may have done with the enactment of the Tijuana River Valley
Estuary and Beach Cleanup Act of 2000.
C. The Tijuana River Valley Estuary and
Beach Cleanup ACT OF 2000
1. An Overview
The Final Supplemental EIS "preferred alternative" to build a CMA
pond system at the SBIWTP in order to achieve secondary treatment ran
into stiff political opposition. This opposition was prompted by
community concerns about the potential odors associated with the
proposed pond system and by the fact that the limited size of the twenty-
five mgd system would inevitably mean future expansion. An impasse
developed. The IBWC needed additional funding to implement the pond
system in the United States because of the $239.4 million spending cap.
It needed at least $35 million in additional appropriations from Congress
to complete the "preferred alternative." Due to local congressional
opposition, Congress refused to move forward on making the additional
appropriations needed to allow the secondary treatment project to be
completed in the United States as proposed.
Instead, Congress mapped a new political strategy to the secondary
59. 41 U.S.C. § 253(c)(1).
60. 41 U.S.C. § 253(c)(2).
61. 41 U.S.C. § 253(c)(7).
62. 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2002). The Anti-Deficiency Act generally prevents a
federal agency from entering into a contract for the future payment of money in advance
of, or in excess of, an existing budget authorization. Id.
63. Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-922 (Supp. H 1990). The
Budget Enforcement Act generally requires that sufficient budget authority be available
at the time legislation is enacted. Id.
treatment issue by enacting the Tijuana River Valley Estuary and Beach
Cleanup Act of 2 0 0 0 .64 Congress abandoned the "preferred alternative"
advanced by the EPA and USIBWC, in favor of secondary treatment at a
"Mexican facility." As defined in the Cleanup Act, the term "Mexican
facility" refers generally to a proposed public-private wastewater treatment
facility. It does not expressly identify or otherwise mention Bajagua.65
Notwithstanding the fact that the Bajagua project is not specifically
named in the legislation, Bajagua appears to be the only public-private
project proposed in Mexico. Thus, at least at this time, it is effectively
the principal alternative for secondary treatment in Mexico.
The Cleanup Act identifies Mexico as the location of the secondary
treatment facility. Because it conflicts with the understanding that
secondary treatment would take place in the United States, the Secretary
of State was "requested" by the law to negotiate and execute either a
new Treaty Minute or an amendment to Treaty Minute 283, in order to
allow for secondary treatment 66 of fifty mgd of sewage in Mexico. In an
effort to promote prompt action, Congress asked the Secretary of State to
"give the highest priority" to the Treaty Minute issue, so that implementation
could be accomplished as "soon as possible. 67 As of November 2001,
no diplomatic progress has been made in achieving this result, and if
experience is a reliable guide, the negotiation process may take years.
While Congress' preference to do the treatment in Mexico is clearly
stated, the Cleanup Act does not commit irrevocably to this end result.
The law states that secondary treatment will be in Mexico "if such
treatment is not provided at a facility in the United States. 68 Consequently,
if an agreement with Mexico does not occur, secondary treatment in the
United States would be necessary to comply with federal and state law.
Another provision of the Cleanup Act is notable. Section 804 requires
the EPA to prepare a comprehensive plan assessing "secondary treatment
,69 7needs," necessary "upgrades in the sewage collection system" in Tijuana,7°
and "recommendations for preferred options" for additional treatment
64. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-43.
65. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-43(6). Although the Bajagua project is not mentioned in the
Cleanup Act, the House Report contains a description of the project. H.R. Rep. No. 106-
842, at 4-5 (2000). Following the discussion of various options to meet secondary
treatment, the following statement is included: "[t]here is no final decision on how best
to provide secondary treatment needs of the San Diego and Mexico border area." Id. See
also 146 Cong. Rec. H7470-03, 7473 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 2000).
66. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-43(4). The term "secondary treatment" has the same
meaning as used in the CWA and implementing regulations.
67. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-45(a).
68. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-44(a)(1)(A).
69. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-44(b)(1).
70. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-44(b)(2).
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capacity in the Tijuana River area.7 This plan is due within two years of
the enactment of the Cleanup Act. This requirement and the caveat "if
such treatment is not provided at a facility in the United States" will
become increasingly significant as California's lawsuit against the
federal government on the operation of the SBIWTP presses forward and
time passes with little tangible action occurring on the diplomatic front.
Notwithstanding some uncertainty as to whether secondary treatment
will occur in Mexico, a careful examination of the Cleanup Act is
warranted. The Act authorizes the Commission72 to enter into a twenty-
year73 "fee-for-services" contract with the owner of a Mexican facility
74
to carry out secondary treatment and to make payments under the
contract. The contract payments, to be made by the USIBWC would
incorporate the costs of developing, financing, constructing, operating
and maintaining the treatment facility in Mexico.75 While the costs for
the entire term of the contract were difficult to assess, the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure estimated the cost to the United States
at approximately $203 million in outlays for the fiscal years 2001-
2005. 6
The law states that the contract "may" be entered into "notwithstanding any
provision of Federal procurement law,"7 7 which may be an attempt to
deal with the concern that the federal Competition in Contracting Act
(CICA) limits awarding the contract to a sole source, such as Bajagua.
While an argument might be advanced that the reference in the Cleanup
Act to "may enter" is ambiguous, Congress' broad intent seems clearly
evidenced by the direction to the Secretary of State to negotiate a new or
amended Treaty Minute. The language in the law, wherein the
Commission is "authorized and directed to provide" secondary treatment
in Mexico, also lends credibility to the view that Congress' intent is
clearly expressed.79
71. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-44(b)(3).
72. The term "Commission" is defined as the "United States section" of the
IBWC. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-43(2).
73. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-44(c)(2)(E).
74. The term "Mexican facility" is defined as a "proposed public-private
wastewater treatment facility" within Mexico. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-43(6).
75. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-44(c)(2)(I).
76. H.R. Rep. No. 106-842, at 9 (2000).
77. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-43(c)(I).
78. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-45(a).
79. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-44(a)(l).
But these references in the Cleanup Act may not be specific enough to
overcome the presumption against sole source treatment. The CICA
authorizes non-competitive procedures only when "a statute expressly
authorizes or requires that the procurement be made through another
executive agency or from a specified source... ,, 80 Section 253(i)8'
presents a serious obstacle to attempting to avoid the use of the
competitive procedures found in the CICA. The Cleanup Act does not
refer either to subsection 253(i)(2)(A) or to subsection 253(i)(2)(C), as
required by law. Additionally, the Cleanup Act does not refer to or
identify any sole source of secondary treatment services to contract with
the SB1WTP. The general statutory language, "notwithstanding any
provision of Federal procurement law," is not likely to nullify the
specific requirements of the CICA. The more likely result is that the
"notwithstanding" language does not create an exception to the CICA's
competition requirements. Therefore, any fee-for-services contract with
the USIBWC is likely to be subject to CICA requirements.
The Cleanup Act refers to the use of competitive procedures. It
requires the Mexican facility to use competitive procedures consistent
with federal procurement law. In fact, the contract between the Commission
and the Mexican facility is required to have a provision wherein the
owner of the Mexican facility will use competitive procedures, which
are consistent with the CICA, in the "procurement of property or
services for the engineering, construction and operation and maintenance
of the Mexican facility." 8  Furthermore, to ensure compliance occurs,
"contractors" are subject to review and approval by the Commission. 83
Thus, oversight of the selection process is provided.
80. 41 U.S.C. § 253(c)(5).
81. 41 U.S.C. § 253 provides as follows:
(i) Merit-based award of contracts
(I) It is the policy of Congress that an executive agency should not be
required by legislation to award a new contract to a specific
non-Federal Government entity. It is further the policy of Congress
that any program, project, or technology identified in legislation be
procured through merit-based selection procedures.
(2) A provision of law may not be construed as requiring a new contract
to be awarded to a specified non-Federal Government entity unless
that provision of law-
(A) specifically refers to this subsection;
(B) specifically identifies the particular non-Federal Government
entity involved; and
(C) specifically states that the award to that entity is required by
such provision of law in contravention of the policy set forth in
paragraph (1).
82. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-44(c)(2)(L).
83. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-44(c)(2)(M).
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2. Enforcement in the Event of Default:
The Contract Provisions
The Cleanup Act authorizes a "public-private" wastewater treatment
plant in Mexico. In the event that the Mexican facility is unable to
provide the necessary level of secondary treatment or is otherwise in
material breach of its obligations, the enforcement provisions of the
contract need to be evaluated.
The Cleanup Act refers to several provisions dealing with breach that
must be in the contract between the USIBWC and the Mexican facility.
The contract is required to provide "for the transfer of ownership of the
Mexican facility to the United States, without a cancellation fee, 4 if the
owner of the Mexican facility fails to perform the obligations of the
owner under the contract." 85  In order to apply this provision, the
ownership interest subject to transfer must be identified with specificity.
Is it the land occupied by the facility, including the pond-based system,
or is it the personal assets of the facility, or the contract right to operate
the facility, or some other "ownership" interest?
Unfortunately, the act is not clear on this point. Thus, prudence dictates
that the contract provide this necessary level of detail. However, one
principle seems clear, it is impractical for the United States to make a
claim to an ownership interest in land that is part of sovereign Mexico
territory pursuant to this default provision. Thus, this interpretation of
the "ownership" interest is not likely to be practical.
In working through the possible application of the "transfer of
ownership" default provision, it is useful to begin by identifying the goal
of the United States in the event of default. Simply stated, it is to insure
compliance with "secondary treatment" standards. This objective may
be adequately protected by being able to control the operation of the
Mexican facility without necessarily having title to it. In other words,
this interest of assuring compliance may be sufficiently protected by
allowing the United States, or its assignee to step into the shoes of
Bajagua for purposes of operating the facility.
Whether this option will be politically and practically acceptable to
both countries is uncertain. Notwithstanding the uncertainty, the ability
84. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-44(c)(2)(J). This section, which applies in the event of
Commission default, contains a "cancellation fee" payable by the United States. Id. The
fee is that amount sufficient to repay construction debt and other amounts that remain
unamortized due to the early termination of the contract. Id.
85. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-44(c)(2)(K).
of the United States to take over the ownership interest of Bajagua in the
event of default can arguably be secured through its assets. Bajagua is
organized and will operate under the law of California. This means that
its assets would be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts in the United
States.
The Bajagua leasehold or contract to operate the facility will be subject to
what might be considered a "sublease" or independent contract. Recall
that the procurement of engineering, construction, and operation and
maintenance of the Mexican facility is subject to competitive procedures, 86
which means that the operation and maintenance of the facility will be
subcontracted. Thus, the procurement contract or sublease would be one of
the assets subject to the transfer provision in the event of default.
Obvious concerns exist, however. If a problem exists with the
provision of secondary treatment, it will be because the sublessee or
subcontractor has failed to meet its obligations. If Bajagua is unable to
secure compliance from the sublessee or contractor, the United States is
not likely to be any more successful. Thus, the contract remedy
identified in the Cleanup Act may provide little practical relief.
An additional complication to the administration of the default
87provision exists. The Bajagua contract term is twenty years. At the
end of the twenty-year period, the Mexican facility is not subject to the
contract regardless of whether default has occurred during the contract
term. Thus, if the United States steps into the shoes of Bajagua to cure
any contract breaches during the initial twenty-year contract, the slate is
wiped clean. Thus, it would appear that the party' holding the rights at
the expiration of the twenty-year period would then be the beneficiary of
added improvements made during the term by the United States.
Therefore, although the Cleanup Act does not require that this potential
windfall matter be addressed, it should be covered in the fee-for-services
contract.
3. Enforcement in the Event of Default:
California Regulatory Remedies
The remedies available under the Cleanup Act are supplementary to
the remedies available under the CWA and Porter-Cologne. 88 There is
no indication that Congress intended that the contract remedies outlined
above were intended to be exclusive in nature. Moreover, the administrative
and judicial remedies available to California as an independent sovereign
state arguably could not be eliminated by Congress.
86. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-44(c)(2)(L).
87. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-44(c)(2)(E).
88. Final SEIS, supra note 45.
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The contract provisions outlined in the Cleanup Act may not be
satisfactory to state regulators should the San Diego Regional Water
Quality Control Board (Regional Board) consider Agua Clara to be the
NPDES permittee. California is not likely to be interested in the
"transfer of ownership" protection, available in the event of default. The
Regional Board, which acts on behalf of California, is apt to want
compliance with the discharge requirements based on federal and state
law, and not the opportunity to pursue breach of contract remedies.
Therefore, the Regional Board predictably, will look to the federal
permittee, which is USIBWC, should a regulatory compliance problem
exist with the operation of Bajagua.
As previously mentioned, care must be exercised in evaluating
Congress' commitment to do secondary treatment in Mexico. The need
for caution was highlighted when the Commissioner of the U.S. Section
announced on November 9, 2001 that the IBWC was "no closer today to
implementing the Mexican treatment project than we were a year ago."
He went on to say:
Without the green light from the administration to negotiate with Mexico and
without funding to implement the project, it became clear to the commission
that the proposal to build the project in Mexico was stalled indefinitely
(emphasis added). Rather than waste another year chasing a project that has
little support in Washington, the commission is committed to proceeding as
quickly as possible to complete secondary treatment. That is why the decision
was made to pursue funding to build an activated sludge secondary treatment
plant as originally planned in the United States.89
As previously mentioned, this activated sludge option was one of the
options analyzed in the NEPA process. At this point, a decided
difference of opinion seems to exist between the executive and
legislative branches on moving forward with secondary treatment in
Mexico. The strength of Congress' commitment to the Cleanup Act, as
well as its influence with the Bush Administration, undoubtedly will be
tested in the near future.
D. People of the State of California v. The International
Boundary and Water Commission, United
States Section
During the early 1990s, steady progress was being made toward
making the international wastewater treatment plant a reality. A draft
89. Ramirez, supra note 54.
EIS was issued for comment in 1991, and the two volume Final EIS was
issued in 1994. In 1996, the IBWC submitted an application to the
Regional Board for an NPDES permit for the discharge of treated
wastewater from the SB1WTP. The application was for the discharge of
twenty-five mgd of secondary effluent. In late 1996, the Regional
Board, issued an NPDES permit, Order Number 96-50, which authorized
the discharge of secondary treated effluent through the SBOO. 90
The Regional Board recognized that it would not be possible for the
SBIWTP to immediately comply with the required secondary treatment
standard. Thus, it simultaneously adopted Cease and Desist Order
Number (CDO) 96-52.91 The CDO set a time schedule for compliance.
After being given two extensions of time by the Regional Board through
addenda to the CDO, the IBWC finally was directed to complete the
secondary treatment facilities, and to begin discharging the secondary
treated effluent through the SBOO by December 31, 2000. The CDO
also set interim standards for the discharge of "advanced primary"
treated effluent to the ocean during the period before secondary
treatment was available.
As the December 2000 deadline contained in the CDO drew near, two
facts became apparent. First, the IBWC would not be able to comply
with the time schedule for secondary treatment contained in Order 96-52.
The second fact that became apparent was that the IBWC also would be
in continuing violation of Order 96-50 (requiring secondary treatment
for discharging advanced primary from the first phase of the SBIWTP.)
The reasons for the delay in meeting the deadline are complicated.
90. Cal. Regional Water Quality Control Board, Order No. 96-50, NPDES No.
CA0108928, Waste Discharge Requirements for the International Boundary and Water
Commission U.S. Section: International Wastewater Treatment Plant Discharge to the
Pacific Ocean Through the South Bay Ocean Outfall San Diego County (November 14,
1996), available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/-rwqcb9/Programs/Special-Programs/
IWTP/IWTPNPDES/SBIWTPNPDESPermitWDR_14Nov96.doc. In addition to
imposing secondary treatment requirements, the NPDES permit imposed additional
effluent limitations and receiving water standards pursuant to California law under the
Ocean Plan and Basin Plan for the San Diego area. Id.
91. Cal. Regional Water Quality Control Board San Diego Region, Cease and
Desist Order No. 96-52, International Boundary and Water Commission U.S. Section,
International Wastewater Treatment Plant South Bay Ocean Outfall San Diego County
(1996), available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/-rwqcb9/Programs/Special-Programs/
IWTP/IWTPCDO/SBIWTPCDO_14Nov96.doc. Cal. Water. Code § 13301 (Cease
and desist order) provides:
When a regional board finds that a discharge of waste is taking place or
threatening to take place in violation of requirements or discharge prohibitions
prescribed by the regional board or the state board, the board may issue an
order to cease and desist and direct that those persons not complying with the
requirements or discharge prohibitions (a) comply forthwith, (b) comply in
accordance with a time schedule set by the board, or (c) in the event of a
threatened violation, take appropriate remedial or preventive action ....
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Part of the delay is attributable to litigation against the IBWC by environmental
organizations over its decision to meet secondary treatment by using an
activated sludge technology which was the preferred alternative
identified in the 1994 EIS. This litigation was settled when the IBWC
agreed to do an SEIS to study the feasibility of using treatment ponds to
accomplish secondary treatment. The litigation extended the environmental
review process. Another reason is that members of San Diego's
congressional delegation insisted that the Bajagua project be analyzed as
a possible way of achieving secondary treatment. This pressure resulted
in a delay in adopting the Record of Decision for the final SEIS, thus
violating the date set in Addendum 2 to the CDO.9 z
As a result of these continuing delays and failures, in August 1999, the
Regional Board forwarded the case to the California Office of the
Attorney General for litigation. Acting on behalf of the Regional Board,
the Attorney General filed a "Notice of Intent to Sue" as required by the
CWA.93 In February 2001, California then filed suit against the USIBWC
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California,94 under
the citizen suit provision of the federal Clean Water Act 95 and on the
basis of federal question jurisdiction.96 Unless there is a settlement, a
trial is expected sometime in mid-2002.
The suit was necessary because despite reassurances that compliance
would be forthcoming, it had not been achieved nor had meaningful
progress been made toward achieving compliance. Proposed solutions
recommended in the final SEIS were not funded, Congress refused to
adjust the $239.4 million statutory cap, and negotiations with Mexico to
adopt a treaty Minute pursuant to the Cleanup Act authorizing a
privately funded secondary treatment plant in Mexico had not produced
92. Cal. Regional Water Quality Control Board San Diego Region, Addendum No.
2 to Cease and Desist Order No. 96-52, International Boundary and Water Commission
U.S. Section, International Wastewater Treatment Plant South Bay Ocean Outfall San
Diego County (1996), available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/-rwqcb9/Programs/Special
_Programs/IWTP/IWTP_CDO/SBIWTP_CDOAdd-2_140ct98.doc. Addendum 2, which
was adopted by the Regional Board in October 1998, directed the IBWC to submit to the
Regional Board 1) an adopted environmental Record of Decision pursuant to NEPA for
the secondary treatment plant by May 1, 1999 and 2) a definitive time schedule for
compliance. Addendum 2 also required compliance with acute toxicity discharge
specifications by May 16, 2000. Id.
93. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b).
94. State of California v. International Boundary and Water Commission, United
States Section, Case No. 01-CV-0270BTM (JFS) (S.D. Ca. 2001).
95. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
tangible results. At the time the suit was filed, the Regional Board could
not predict with any confidence when the IBWC would meet its legal
obligations. Compliance seemed, at a minimum, several years away.
In the interim, the federal government was violating federal and state
law on a daily basis without legal consequence. Admittedly, the USIBWC
was, and continues to be, in a difficult situation. Congress refused to
appropriate the monies to complete the secondary treatment facilities in
the United States, refused to approve funds to implement the Mexican
treatment plant,97 and the IBWC claimed to have no authorization to
negotiate the agreement contained in the Cleanup Act. 98 In short, the
federal machinery was deadlocked.
But, the public is, unfortunately, all too familiar with this refrain.
CWA violations by federal facilities are a familiar occurrence. At the
national level, reports exist that federal facilities historically fail to
comply with the CWA twice as frequently as private industry. 9 At the
regional level, the Regional Board reports that federal facilities
constitute close to seventy-five percent of NPDES permit violations in
its' region.100 In the reporting period 2000-01, the Regional Board
identifies thirty-three sewer collection agencies in its region. Of these
thirty-three agencies, federal-military facilities rank in the top four of
spills per one hundred miles.' 0' The record of federal facilities leaves
much to be desired.
The suit alleges that IBWC was in violation of the CDO, as well as
state and federal law. It asks for three things. First, the lawsuit requests
a judicial declaration that the operation of the plant below the required
secondary standards violates the Clean Water Act, the California Porter-
Cologne Act, 10 2 and the IBWC's Waste Discharge Permit'0 3 issued by
the Regional Board. Second, it asks for a judicially imposed time-schedule to
ensure completion of the plant's legal water quality obligations. Finally,
it asked for "coercive penalties" against the IBWC, should the federal
97. Ramirez, supra note 54.
98. Id.
99. U.S. General Accounting Office Report to Congressional Requestors Water
Pollution, Stronger Enforcement Needed to Improve Compliance of Federal Facilities,
GAO RCED-89-13, at 3 (Dec. 1988).
100. California Water Quality Control Board, Region 9 San Diego, Sanitary Sewage
Overflow (SSO) Spill Data (2000), available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/rwqcb9/
Programs/SSO/SSOSpillData/Sewer990.xls. For the reporting period (July I, 1999
through July 7, 2000) there were 1608 reported NPDES violations in the San Diego
Region. Of those, approximately 75% were attributable to two federal facilities, the
International Wastewater Treatment Plant and five units at Camp Pendleton. This report
is also on file at the San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board.
101. Id.
102. Cal. Water Code §§ 13020-13389.
103. IWBC, supra note 23, at Minute 283.
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government fail to meet any court-imposed schedule for compliance.
The failure by the Regional Board to take action to protect the
interests of California would carry serious adverse consequences.
Inaction would convey the appearance that the Regional Board, which is
the state agency charged with enforcing the Clean Water Act, Porter-
Cologne Act, and I!BWC's waste discharge permit,' °4 sanctions the
continuing violations of law as "acceptable" or as "business as usual." It
is neither. In a broader sense, the failure of the Regional Board to act
would have the potential of undermining confidence in the regulatory
process designed to protect the public.
In addition, the lawsuit was necessary because the doctrine of federal
sovereign immunity limited California's other options. The role of
federal sovereign immunity under the CWA was examined by the
Supreme Court in the controlling case of United States Department of
Energy v. Ohio.10 5 The case sets the legal parameters to understanding
California's claim to "coercive penalties" in the IBWC litigation.
In Department of Energy, the Supreme Court considered whether
Congress had waived federal sovereign immunity for past violations of
the CWA. Fundamental to the court's interpretation of the CWA's
federal facilities provision 0 6 is the argument that the term "sanctions"
requires one to distinguish between "punitive fines" and "coercive fines."
104. Id.
105. 503 U.S. 607 (1992). Ohio sued the Department of Energy and others for
improperly disposing hazardous waste from its uranium-processing plant in Fernald,
Ohio. The Department of Energy moved to dismiss. The District Court denied the
motion and found that Clean Water Act (CWA) and Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 90 Stat. 2796, as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992,
waived federal sovereign immunity from punitive fines. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the CWA waiver, but found that sovereign immunity had not been waived
under RCRA. The Supreme Court held that United States' sovereign immunity from
liability for civil fines imposed by states for past violations under both the CWA and
RCRA, had not been waived by Congress. Id. at 615-29.
106. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2001). This section provides that
[elach department, agency, or instrumentality of the... Federal Government... shall be
subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements,
administrative authority, and process and sanctions respecting the control and abatement
of water pollution in the same manner... as any nongovernmental entity.... The
preceding sentence shall apply (A) to any requirement whether substantive or procedural
(including any recordkeeping or reporting requirement, any requirement respecting
permits and any other requirement, whatsoever), (B) to the exercise of any Federal, State
or local administrative authority, and (C) to any process and sanction (emphasis added),
whether enforced in Federal, State, or local courts or in any other manner.... [T]he
United States shall be liable only for those civil penalties arising under Federal law or
imposed by a State or local court to enforce an order or the process of such court. Id.
Based on this distinction, which parenthetically is a distinction not
expressly mentioned in the CWA, the court reasoned that Congress had
waived sovereign immunity with respect to "coercive sanctions," but not
"punitive sanctions." The Court cited Latrobe Steel Co. v. United
Steelworkers of America, Local 1537107 for the view that
coercive sanctions. . . look to the future and are designed to aid the plaintiff by
bringing a defiant party into compliance with the court order or by assuring that
a potentially contumacious party adheres to an injunction by setting forth in
advance the penalties the court will impose if the party deviates from the path of
obedience. 108
The Court reasoned that the federal facilities' language "speaks of
sanctions in the context of enforcing 'process' as distinct from substantive
requirements," and thus justified the inference that Congress was using
'sanction' in its coercive sense, to the exclusion of punitive fines.'°9
Although this restrictive interpretation of the waiver of sovereign
immunity under the CWA was criticized by the dissent in Department of
Energy as "analytic gymnastics" in defiance of the words actually used
by Congress,'0 the distinction drawn by the majority is the basis for the
demand of "coercive penalties" against the IBWC in the USIBWC
litigation. While punitive fines for past violations of the CWA may not
be possible under the Department of Energy rationale, forward-looking
penalties are authorized by the Supreme Court's in Department of
Energy.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Tijuana River Valley Estuary and Beach Cleanup Act of 2000
expressed Congress' intent that twenty-five mgd of Tijuana's wastewater
be treated to secondary levels at a Mexican facility. This action reversed
ten years of policy specifying that the secondary treatment would be
done at the SB1WTP in the United States, pursuant to Minute 283. To
date, little tangible progress on the diplomatic front has occurred to
implement this federal law.
People of the State of California v. International Boundary and Water
Commission, United States Section"' is California's response to the
failure of the federal government to meet its obligations under federal
and state law. Litigation was necessary because the doctrine of sovereign
immunity presents a significant obstacle to securing compliance from
107. 545 F.2d 1336, 1344 (1976).
108. Department of Energy, 506 U.S. at 621-22.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 630 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Ill. State of California v. International Boundary and Water Commission, United
States Section, Case No. 01-CV-0270BTM (JFS) (S.D. Ca. 2001).
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the federal government of its obligations under the CWA and state law.
California's demand in the litigation for "coercive penalties," based on
the Supreme Court decision in Department of Energy v. Ohio, may
provide an important catalyst to breaking the political logjam at the
federal level. Unfortunately, the reality is that it is apt to be years before
the sewage effluent coming from Mexico is treated to the secondary
standard mandated by state and federal law.
In the interim, several operative principles should guide decision
makers as progress is made toward achieving the mandated water quality
standards. First, as much effluent coming from Mexico as possible
should be treated. In addition, it should be treated to the highest level of
treatment possible before being discharged. The option of "no treatment,"
by ceasing the discharge from the SBIWTP in order to avoid coercive
penalties under the CWA, should be firmly rejected. The "no treatment"
option is inconsistent with the principles contained in the international
agreements between the United States and Mexico. Moreover, it would
be bad public policy.
Second, to the maximum extent practicable, the discharge should be
through the SBOO, rather than into the Tijuana River. The South Bay
Reclamation Plant, owned by the City of San Diego and in the proximity
of the SBIWTP, is potentially available in early 2002 to assist in
securing partial compliance. It has fifteen mgd of secondary treatment
capacity, and perhaps more, that might be used by the IBWC in meeting
its obligations pending a permanent solution. Using the South Bay
Reclamation Plant as part of the solution obviously would require the
cooperation of the City of San Diego.
The remaining ten mgd of non-complying effluent could be physically
dealt with by returning it to Mexico for disposition, sending it to the San
Diego Point Loma Wastewater Treatment Plant using the "emergency
connection," or allowing it to be discharged through the SBOO in
violation of the law. Unfortunately, shortcomings exist with each option.
The "return-to-sender" option would result in greater harm to the
public and environment than continuing to discharge the advanced
primary through the SBOO. If the effluent is returned to Mexico, in all
likelihood, it would be discharged from the Mexican treatment plant at
San Antonio de los Buenos without any primary or secondary treatment.
This option would also implicate possible legal challenges. The "return-
to-sender" policy would appear to conflict with Minute 283112 and its
underlying policy. In short, this option would upset Mexico more than
the lack of secondary treatment, and threaten the agreed to structure for
dealing with cross-border wastewater.
Using San Diego's Point Loma Wastewater Treatment Plant is also
problematic. It would potentially create CWA problems for San Diego.
In addition, the "emergency connection" was never intended for the type
of long-term use that would be necessary, pending the implementation of
the secondary treatment solution; so there are likely to be technical
concerns with using this option. Consequently, using the "emergency
connection" as part of an interim solution is likely to give the federal and
state regulatory agencies significant pause.
Continuing to discharge the ten mgd of non-complying effluent
through the SBOO obviously conflicts with federal and state law. With
no certain time schedule for compliance in sight, this option is also
problematic. Even with an agreed to time schedule, this option is not
optimal.
A final operative principle can be stated. A greater political effort should
be made to implement the Cleanup Act, so that secondary treatment
occurs as quickly as possible. To date, little tangible effort has been
made in this regard and further delay is unwarranted. It is simply
unacceptable for the federal government to fail to resolve this longstanding
cross-border wastewater crisis.
112. IBWC, supra note 23, at Minute 283, Recommendation 6. It provides:
"Construction, operation and maintenance in the United States at United States expense,
of a deep ocean outfall with ... a capacity to discharge into the Pacific Ocean at least 25
mgd (1100 lps) of treated sewage from the international plant."
